Corso di laurea: Finanza Aziendale Programmazione per l'A.A. 2012/2013

L’insegnamento si propone di far acquisire
agli studenti gli strumenti economici indispensabili per lo studio e la
comprensione di tutte le altre discipline economiche, nonché un’adeguata
capacità di analisi dei problemi economici reali.

Testi di riferimento:
1) Mas-Colell, A., Whinston M. D., Green J. R., “Microeconomic Theory”, Oxford University Press, 1995.
2) Frank R. H., “Microeconomia”, McGraw-Hill, 2010.

Articoli di riferimento:
1) Akerlof, G. A. (1970), “The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, pp. 488-500.
2) Bester, H. (1985), “Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information”, American Economic Review,
75, pp. 850-855.
3) de Meza, D. and Webb, D. (1987), “Too much Investment: A Problem of Asymmetric Information”, Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 102, pp. 281-292.
4) Lacker, J. M. (1994), “Does adverse Selection Justify Government Intervention in Loan Markets”, Federal Reserve Bank of
Richmond Economic Quarterly, 80, pp. 61-95.
5) Rothschild, M. and Stiglitz J. (1976), “Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect
Information": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90, pp. 629-649.
6) Spence, M. (1973), “Job Market Signaling”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87, pp. 355-374.
7) Stiglitz, J. and Weiss, A. (1981), “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information”, American Economic Review,
71, pp. 393-410.
8) Wilson, C. (1977), “A Model of Insurance Markets with Incomplete Information”, Journal of Economic Theory, 16, pp. 167-207.
9) Armendariz de Aghion, B. and Gollier, A. (1981), “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information”, American Economic Review,
71, pp. 393-410.